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I. INTRODUCTION
As the commercial world becomes a smaller community comprised
of networks of businesses conducting international transactions daily,
the benefits and even the necessities of international commercial arbi-
tration become evident. Although not among the first nations to recog-
nize the necessity of international commercial arbitration, the United
States has nevertheless quickly developed one of the strongest pro-en-
(13)
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forcement policies of both arbitration agreements and arbitral awards.'
This pro-enforcement policy, mandating in most cases that parties pro-
ceed first to arbitration to settle disputes and subsequently respect
awards granted by arbitral bodies, is primarily governed by the 1958
United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards2 which the United States ratified in 1970.3
This paper will examine the philosophy of enforcement of foreign
arbitral awards under the 1958 United Nations Convention still devel-
oping within the United States federal court system. It will summarize
the minimal requirements needed to ensure enforcement of arbitral
awards, and it will examine the various defenses to enforcement of
these awards possible under the 1958 United Nations Convention as
interpreted by the federal court system.
II. UNITED STATES JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT OF ARBITRAL AWARDS
UNDER THE 1958 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE
RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT
OF FOREIGN ARBITRAL AWARDS.
A. Introduction
Prior to the United States' ratification of the 1958 United Nations
Convention, parties entering into international contracts containing ar-
bitration clauses were faced with much uncertainty concerning their
mutual agreement to first enter into arbitration proceedings before
seeking recourse in the courts. Domestic arbitration laws provided the
only guidance concerning these agreements and their subsequent en-
forcement.4 However, these laws were outdated, unfavorable to arbitra-
tion, and lacking in uniformity. In response to this lack of uniformity
and to the increase in international trade and arbitration in the years
following World War I, the League of Nations and the International
Chamber of Commerce sponsored an international effort which resulted
in two multilateral treaties: the Geneva Protocol on Arbitration Clauses
1. See generally McLaughlin & Genevro, Enforcement of Arbitral Awards Under
the New York Convention - Practice in U.S. Courts, 3 INT'L TAX & Bus. LAW. 249,
250 (1986).
2. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,
June 10, 1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 38, No. 4739 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Convention.]
3. The United States Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 201 (1982) as amended by Pub.
L. No. 91-383, 84 Stat. 692 (1976).
4. See generally A. VAN DEN BERG, THE NEW YORK ARBITRATION CONVENTION
OF 1958, at 6 (1981).
5. id.
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of 1923; and, the Geneva Convention on the Execution of Foreign
Awards of 1927.6 Although an improvement, the inadequacies of these
treaties prompted a gathering of representatives of nations in New
York City in 1958.' These representatives met with the aim of adopting
a much more satisfactory international agreement that would promote,
rather than retard, international commercial arbitration. The result
was the 1958 United Nations Convention on the Recognition and En-
forcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards.8
The United States, not having ratified any of the previous treaties
concerning international arbitration, remained cautious concerning ar-
bitration and arbitral award enforcement. This cautiousness was the
result of a deeply embedded judicial jealousy of arbitration and its po-
tential encroachment upon what many considered to be uniquely judi-
cial territory. 9 However, after a gradual but determined erosion of this
jealousy based on the judicial recognition of the true value of arbitra-
tion, the United States finally ratified the Convention in 1970 and
adopted Chapter Two of the United States Arbitration Act which im-
plemented the Convention."0
Since its ratification, the federal courts have adopted a pro-en-
forcement philosophy that has rigorously promoted the Convention's
goal of making "arbitration a more certain and efficient means of
resolving international disputes."" By liberally construing the require-
ments for enforcement of arbitral awards and narrowly interpreting
enumerated defenses to confirmation of awards listed within the Con-
vention itself, the federal courts have made the United States one of
the most advantageous forums in the world in which to seek enforce-
ment of foreign arbitral awards.' 2
Invocation of the Convention in order to enforce an arbitral award
is generally unnecessary.'" Typically, parties that have voluntarily en-
6. id. at 6-7.
7. Id. at 7-8.
8. Id. at 397-401.
9. Sedco, Inc. v. Petroleos Mexicanos Mexican Nat'l Oil Co., 767 F.2d 1140,
1145 n.12 (1985).
10. 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208 (1982).
11. McLaughlin & Genevro, supra note 1, at 251.
12. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 517 n.10 (1974). The Supreme
Court leaves no doubt that "[tihe goal of the convention, and the principal pur-
pose underlying American adoption and implementation of it, was to encourage
the recognition and enforcement of commercial arbitration agreements and inter-
national contracts and to unify the standard by which the agreements to arbitrate
are observed and arbitral awards are enforced in the signatory countries. Id.
13. McLaughlin & Genevro, supra note 1, at 272.
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tered into an arbitration agreement will also voluntarily abide by the
results of such an agreement. However, in situations where one party
refuses to follow the award of an arbitral panel, a judicial body must
convert the arbitration award into an enforceable judicial order due to
the arbitral panels lack of power to enforce their awards. Because of
the United States federal courts' pro-enforcement philosophies, Ameri-
can businessmen can enter into international agreements containing ar-
bitration clauses and be assured of judicial enforcement of resulting
awards by the United States court system. 14
B. Minimum Requirements for Invocation of the Convention
When a party must resort to the 1958 Convention for judicial en-
forcement of an award, he must comply with only a minimum of re-
quirements. Article IV of the Convention stipulates that "the party ap-
plying for recognition and enforcement shall .... supply ... the duly
authenticated original award [and] ... the original [arbitration] agree-
ment. ."1 Most significantly, the complaining party is not required to
prove the arbitral award is binding in the country where the award was
granted. 16
The technical sufficiency of these minimal requirements for en-
forcement of an arbitral award as set forth by the Convention has been
upheld by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
In Bergesen v. Joseph Muller Corp.,'7 the court was faced with an as-
sertion that a petition for enforcement was "technically insufficient."1 8
A Norwegian owner of cargo vessels, Bergesen, petitioned the court to
confirm and enter judgment upon an arbitral award made in New York
City against the charterer of his vessels, Mueller.' 9 Among other de-
fenses, Mueller argued that the documents presented did not meet the
requirements of the Convention because the original agreement from
which the copy was made and subsequently certified had not also been
14. See e.g., Bergesen v. Joseph Muller Corp., 548 F. Supp. 650, 654 (S.D.N.Y.
1982), affid, 710 F.2d 928 (2d Cir. 1983).
15. Convention, supra note 2, at 4, art. IV. Although requiring the arbitration
agreement to be in writing, the Convention recognizes the peculiar circumstances in-
herent in international trade and, therefore, does not require both parties to sign the
same document. In fact, the Convention recognizes the exchange of written letters as a
valid arbitration agreement. AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASS'N, NEW STRATEGIES FOR
PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS DISPUTES, 19 (1971).
16. AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASS'N, supra note 15, at 16.
17. Bergesen, 710 F.2d 928.
18. Id. at 934.
19. Id. at 930.
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authenticated. 20 The court believed that this interpretation would be
too restrictive2' and held that "copies of the award and the agreement
which have been certified by a member of the arbitration panel provide
a sufficient basis upon which to enforce the award.22
In addition to enjoying only minimal requirements needed to sup-
port a prima facie case for enforcement, the complaining arbitration
party also enjoys the lack of any burden to prove the validity of the
arbitral award. Instead, "It]he burden of proving the invalidity of the
award rests upon the defendant ....
In order to prove the invalidity of the arbitral award, the party
opposing enforcement must prove one of the seven defenses enumerated
in the Convention 24 or he must prove applicability of one of the reser-
vations with which the United States ratified the Convention. 25 Absent
these avenues of defense, parties have sometimes sought to prove that
either the Convention does not apply to the particular arbitral award at
issue and, therefore, the particular court in which enforcement is
sought lacks subject matter jurisdiction,26 or that the court lacks in
personam jurisdiction.17
C. Determination of Federal Jurisdiction
1. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
The determination of jurisdiction, both subject matter and in per-
sonam, has been one of the most confusing issues surrounding the Con-
vention. This confusion, coupled with the lack of any clearly defined
jurisdictional limits, has provided the federal courts with an opportu-
nity to promote their pro-enforcement philosophy through recent devel-
20. Id. at 934.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. von Mehren, The Enforcement of Arbitral Awards Under Conventions and
United States Law, 9 YALE J. WORLD PUB.. ORD. Vol. 9, no. 2, 343, 346 (1983). As
one commentator states, "this burden discourages contesting enforcement of an
award." McLaughlin & Genevro, supra note 1, at 258 n.56 (noting The Validity of the
Foreign Sovereign Immunity Defense in Suits Under the Convention on the Recogni-
tion and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 7 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 321, 332
(1983-1984)).
24. Convention, supra note 2, at 40, 42, art. V. For a discussion of these defenses,
see infra notes 76-222 and accompanying text.
25. Id. at 38, art. 1. For a discussion of these reservations, see infra notes 223-235
and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 28-59 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
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opments in the interpretation and expansion of federal jurisdiction.
Generally, 9 U.S.C. §203 grants subject matter jurisdiction to fed-
eral district courts to hear cases to recognize and enforce foreign arbi-
tral awards falling under the Convention.28 Although the language of 9
U.S.C. §203 seems unambiguous, a difficulty often arises in determin-
ing which arbitral awards can be enforced under the Convention. Arti-
cle I of the Convention defines the scope of the Convention as "ap-
ply[ing] to the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards made in
the territory of a State other than the State where the recognition and
enforcement ...are sought, . . . [and] arbitral awards not considered
as domestic awards in the State where their recognition and enforce-
ment are sought."29
Applying the first part of this jurisdictional description is relatively
simple: so long as the award was not made in the country where en-
forcement is being sought, and was made in another contracting state
(so as to meet the requirements of reciprocity), the arbitral award may
be enforced under the Convention.30 However, it is the definition and
application of the phrase "domestic" in the second part of the descrip-
tion that has proved to be the most troublesome, yet attractive, vehicle
to federal courts enforcing arbitral awards.
Originally, only the first part, dealing with arbitral awards made
in the territory of another state, was to have been included within Arti-
cle I of the Convention."1 However, "[t]hat provision was criticized as
placing undue emphasis on the place in which an award was made,
since the place of an award was often fortuitous or artificial. 32 Several
participating countries objected "believ[ing] that the nationality of the
parties, the subject of the dispute and the rules of arbitral procedure
were factors to be taken into account in determining whether an award
was foreign."3 " In addition, some of the countries which opposed a ju-
risdictional scope limited only to the description in the first part of Ar-
ticle I believed that the State law under which the arbitration agree-
28. "The district courts of the United States ... shall have original jurisdiction
over such an action or proceeding, regardless of the amount in controversy." 9 U.S.C.
§203 (1982). See also Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Societe Generale De
L'Industrie Du Papier, 508 F.2d 969, 971 (2d Cir. 1974) for judicial interpretation of
this section.
29. Convention, supra note 2, at 38, art. .
30. This statement assumes the court has in personam jurisdiction, an issue that
will be examined in later text. See infra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
31. Bergesen, 710 F.2d at 931.
32. AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASS'N, supra note 15, at 17-18.
33. Bergesen, 710 F.2d at 931, citing G. Haight, Convention on the Recognition
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards I at 2 (1958) (Haight).
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ment was formed should also govern the "nationality of an award." 3'
Therefore, the second part of the jurisdictional description was added
to the Convention with the intention of leaving the resolution of
"nondomestic" situations to each contracting State.
Through the addition of this second part, the drafters of the Con-
vention simultaneously enlarged the jurisdiction of both the Convention
itself and the courts seeking to enforce awards under it. "Article I(1)
makes it clear that the 'awards not considered as domestic awards'
form a category of awards which is additional to that of the awards
made in another State. '3 5 This additional category of awards falling
under the Convention was only to be limited by the definition of
"nondomestic" arrived at by each contracting state.
Within the United States, the term "nondomestic" has primarily
been judicially defined, with the exception of one statutorily determined
situation that the Congress has delineated as "domestic". In this spe-
cific situation, the agreement or award will not fall under the Conven-
tion if it "aris[es] out of such a relationship which is entirely between
citizens of the United States ... unless that relationship involves prop-
erty located abroad, envisages performance or enforcement abroad, or
has some other reasonable relation with one or more foreign states."3 6
One author has noted that this particular definition of "domestic" does
not comply with the Convention, for it was agreed and understood that
the nationalities of the parties to the arbitration were not to be a "per-
tinent consideration" in determining whether the award would be gov-
erned by the Convention37 . However, it has been observed that it is
unlikely that this will ever give rise to any reaction from other con-
tracting states.38
Other than this one statutory guideline, the federal courts have
been free to develop the term "nondomestic" with limited legislative
interference.3 9
34. Id.
35. G. GAJA, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, NEW YORK CONVEN-
TION, I.A.3 (G. GAJA ed. 1978).
36. 9 U.S.C. § 202 (1982).
37. McMahon, Implementation of the United Nations Convention on Foreign Ar-
bitral Awards in the United States, 2 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 735, 738-39 (1970-71).
38. See generally GAJA, supra note 35.
39. This judicial development of the term "nondomestic" and the parallel expan-
sion of federal jurisdiction have occurred only in the lower federal courts. The Supreme
Court has not yet addressed the issue.
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2. Expansion of Subject Matter Jurisdiction
The expansion of the definition of "nondomestic" in the lower fed-
eral courts began in 1977 when a New York District Court was faced
with potential jurisdiction under the Convention over two foreign par-
ties seeking a judicial order to compel arbitration. Without explanation,
the court in Ferrara S.P.A. v. United Grain Growers40 declared that
Chapter 2 of the United States Arbitration Act"1 conferred subject
matter jurisdiction over the controversy. The court ordered a Canadian
corporation and two Italian corporations to proceed to arbitration, as
specified in their contract.'2
In 1979, the same court once again ordered arbitration in a dis-
pute arising between two Japanese corporations and a company incor-
porated in Panama. In Sumitomo Corp. v. Parakopi Compania Mari-
tima,'3 the parties had agreed to arbitrate any difference arising under
their contract in New York City in accordance with the rules of the
United States Arbitration Act." Unlike the court in Ferrara, the
Sumitomo court discussed at length its finding of subject matter
jurisdiction.
The Panamanian corporation, Parakopi, seeking to avoid the arbi-
tration sought by the two Japanese corporations, argued that only
Chapter One of the United States Arbitration Act, enacted in 1925
prior to the 1958 Convention, applied to the present case.' 5 Chapter
One of the 1925 act was adopted to regulate arbitration in maritime
transactions and any contract involving "commerce."' 46 Parakopi
argued that "commerce" as defined in Chapter One did not include
contracts involving only foreign corporations. 7
The court disagreed with this argument, holding that Chapter One
of the 1925 Act did not control the scope of the implementing legisla-
tion for the 1958 Convention.'8 The court further stated that "[i]n de-
lineating the coverage of the Convention, Congress explicitly excluded
purely domestic transactions. Had Congress also intended to exclude
40. In re Ferrara S.P.A., 441 F. Supp. 778, 780 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), af'd mem., sub
nom. Ferrara S.P.A. v. United Grain Growers, Ltd., 580 F.2d 1044 (2d Cir. 1978).
41. See supra note 3.
42. In re Ferrara, 441 F. Supp. at 779.
43. Sumitomo Corp. v. Parakopi Compania Maritima, 477 F. Supp. 737
(S.D.N.Y. 1979), affd mem., 620 F.2d 286 (2d Cir. 1980).
44. Id. at 740.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 741.
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purely foreign transactions, it undoubtedly would have done so explic-
itly as well."4 9
On several occasions, the issue of jurisdictional scope of the Con-
vention has presented itself to appellate courts. In 1978, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit refused to address the
issue of jurisdiction over totally foreign parties in an action to confirm
an arbitral award issued in New York City.50 However, the court went
on to confirm the award under Chapter One of the United States Arbi-
tration Act noting that Chapter Two of the same act was certainly no
more liberal on the matter of vacating awards than Chapter One and
therefore, "resort to the Convention would not alter the result. '51 Not
until 1983, in the case Bergesen v. Joseph Muller Corp., did the Sec-
ond Circuit address the issue of possible jurisdiction over two foreign
parties. 52
The Second Circuit in Bergesen affirmed the district court's find-
ing of jurisdiction under the Convention over an arbitral agreement and
subsequent award between all foreign parties. The district court, noting
the earlier finding of jurisdiction under the Convention to compel arbi-
tration between foreign parties in Sumitomo, concluded that it also had
jurisdiction to confirm an award rendered in New York City between
two foreign entities.53 The United States Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit agreed, rejecting appellant's contentions that the court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction. 54 Appellant argued that the award
did not fall under the Convention because it was "neither territorially a
'foreign' award nor an award 'not considered as domestic' within the
meaning of the Convention. '5 5 The court summarized the history of
Article I of the Convention and concluded that the definition of
"nondomestic" was omitted "deliberately in order to cover as wide a
variety of eligible awards as possible, while permitting the enforcing
authority to supply its own definition of 'nondomestic' in conformity
49. Id. The court further noted that "[tlo hold that subject matter jurisdiction is
lacking where the parties involved are all foreign entities would certainly undermine
the goal of encouraging the recognition and enforcement of arbitration agreements in
international contracts." Id.
50. "We find this controversy intriguing, but we need not resolve it here." In re
Andros Compani Maritima v. Marc Rich & Co., 579 F.2d 691, 699 n.ll (2d Cir.
1978).
51. Id.
52. Bergesen, 710 F.2d at 928.
53. Bergesen, 548 F. Supp. at 651-653.
54. Bergesen, 710 F.2d at 928.
55. Id. at 930.
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with its own national law." 66 The court then seized upon this opportu-
nity to define "nondomestic."
We adopt the view that awards "not considered as domestic" de-
notes awards which are subject to the Convention not because
made abroad, but because made within the legal framework of an-
other country, e.g., pronounced in accordance with foreign law or
involving parties domiciled or having their principal place of busi-
ness outside the enforcing jurisdiction.5
Applying this standard to the facts, the court found proper subject
matter jurisdiction conveyed by the 1958 Convention.
Because of the federal court's continuing expansion of jurisdiction
under the Convention, it is very difficult for a party opposing enforce-
ment of an arbitral award to successfully defend against such enforce-
ment on the grounds of lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Courts have
now held that the Convention applies to awards between totally foreign
parties as in Bergensen and Sumitomo, between one foreign and one
domestic party,5 8 and between two domestic parties where the contract
involved a reasonable relationship with a foreign state.,"
3. In Personam Jurisdiction
In addition to requiring subject matter jurisdiction over the par-
ties, the court must also have in personam jurisdiction. Recently, the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
refused to confirm an arbitral award rendered in London because the
court lacked in personam jurisdiction over the Panamanian corporation
against whom the award was made. In Transatlantic Bulk Shipping v.
Saudi Chartering,60 Transatlantic, a Liberian ocean carrier, sought
confirmation of an arbitral award. The court stated that in order for a
plaintiff to invoke the power of the court in such a case, the defendant
56. Id. at 932.
57. Id. The court further noted that "[they] prefer this broader construction be-
cause it is more in line with the intended purpose of the treaty, which was entered into
to encourage the recognition and enforcement of international arbitration awards." Id.
58. Fertilizer Corp. of India v. IDI Management, 517 F. Supp. 948 (S.D. Ohio
1981), affid on rehearing, 530 F. Supp. 542 (S.D. Ohio 1982); see also Ledee v. Cer-
amiche Ragno, 684 F.2d 184 (Ist Cir. 1982).
59. Fuller Co. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 421 F. Supp. 938 (W.D. Pa.
1976).
60. Transatlantic Bulk Shipping v. Saudi Chartering, S.A., 622 F. Supp. 25
(S.D.N.Y. 1985).
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must be subject to the court's jurisdiction by "either resid[ing] within
the court's power or hav[ing] acted in such fashion as to bring himself
within the court's power."6 Simply because the Convention granted
subject matter jurisdiction to the courts in an area previously not
within their jurisdiction, the federal district courts are not viewed as
having "power over all persons throughout the world who have entered
into an arbitration agreement covered by the Convention." '62 The court
stated that jurisdiction could be conferred by a defendant's residence,
his conduct, his consent, or the location of property. 3 The court noted
that its decision was not inconsistent with Bergesen or Sumitomo be-
cause in those cases the parties had consented to the court's in per-
sonam jurisdiction by agreeing to arbitrate their disputes in New York
City.6"
In light of Transatlantic, parties wishing to afford themselves of
the opportunity to utilize American courts for enforcement of arbitral
awards must be careful to set the site of arbitration within the United
States to avoid potential in personam jurisdictional problems. The
courts' recent willingness to extend their subject matter jurisdiction is
not reflected in issues involving in personam jurisdiction.
4. Problems of Sovereign Immunity
Another jurisdictional issue which has confronted the courts re-
cently is that of their power to enforce an arbitral award against a
sovereign state notwithstanding the defense of sovereign immunity. In
their continuing desire to promote the goals of the Convention, the
courts in most cases have found that the sovereign states have implic-
itly waived their immunity to the jurisdiction of the United States fed-
eral courts.
The Federal Republic of Nigeria was found to have explicitly
waived its sovereign immunity by agreeing that the "construction, va-
lidity and performance of [a] contract would be governed by the laws
of Switzerland and that any disputes arising under the contract would
be submitted to arbitration by the International Chamber of Com-
merce in Paris, France." 65 This finding has been characterized as con-
61. Id. at 27 citing International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310
(1945).
62. Id.
63. id.
64. Id.
65. Ipitrade International v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 465 F. Supp. 824, 826
(D.D.C. 1978).
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sistent with the exception explicitly stated in §1605(a)(1) of the For-
eign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976,66 where immunity is denied to
any sovereign state that has "waived its immunity either explicitly or
by implication .... ,,17 This required waiver has been inferred from an
agreement to arbitrate.6 8
A similar finding was made by the same court two years later in
Libyan American Oil Co. v. Socialist People's Libyan Aran
Jamahirya.6 9 Although refusing to confirm and enforce an arbitral
award due to the act of state doctrine, the court found that Libya had
implicitly waived its defense of sovereign immunity by agreeing to arbi-
trate "where the parties agreed or where the arbitrators might
agree."17 0 The court noted that although the United States was not
named, consent to arbitrate wherever the arbitrators determined was
implicitly an agreement to arbitrate in the United States, thereby
meeting both the implicit waiver requirement and providing a nexus
between the lawsuit and the United States.71 This connection provided
the court with original in personam jurisdiction over the parties. 72
Although the law is somewhat unsettled surrounding sovereign im-
munity and the Convention, it appears from cases such as Ipitrade In-
ternational and Libyan American Oil that courts will enforce arbitral
awards even when faced with the defense of sovereign immunity. In
fact, it is more probable that a waiver of sovereign immunity will be
66. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (1982).
67. von Mehren, supra note 23, at 353.
68. Id. at n.66 citing Ohntrup v. Firearms Center, Inc., 516 F. Supp. 1281, 1284
(E.D. Pa. 1981).
69. Libyan American Oil Co. v. Socialist People's Libyan Aran Jamahirya, 482 F.
Supp. 1175 (D.D.C. 1980).
70. Id. at 1178.
71. Id. at 1177-78.
72. Id. One author has noted that the findings reached in cases such as Ipitrade
International are in accordance with the Convention. In his article, Waiver of Foreign
Sovereign Immunity by Agreement to Arbitrate: Legislation Proposed by the Ameri-
can Bar Association, Feldman calls attention to the fact that the Convention was in-
tended by its drafters to apply to awards rendered against foreign states. 40 THE ARB.
J. 24, 29 (Mar. 1985). "The 'expression in Article 1 (1) "differences between persons,
whether physical or legal" was inserted in the Convention on the understanding that an
arbitration agreement and an arbitral award to which a State is a party are not ex-
cluded from the gambit of the Convention.'" Id. quoting A. VAN DEN BERG, supra
note 4, at 279, quoting Article I(1) of the Convention. Feldman notes that sovereign
immunity is not one of the enumerated defenses expressly provided in the Convention,
and therefore, recognition of the defense of sovereign immunity could be viewed as a
violation of the forum state's obligation to the contracting party in whose state the
award was made. Id. at 30.
FOREIGN ARBITRAL AWARDS
found when the arbitration agreement either explicitly or implicitly
designates the United States as the site of the arbitration proceedings.73
In Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria,74 the court found an
implicit waiver of immunity grounded upon an agreement to arbitrate
in a country other than the United States to be too tenuous.7 5 Based
upon the Verlinden decision, parties should designate the United States
as the place of arbitration in order to maximize the probability of en-
forcement of arbitral awards against a foreign state.
D. Avoiding Confirmation and Enforcement of an Arbitral Award.
Defenses Under the Convention
In addition to citing a lack of subject matter or in personam juris-
diction or the presentation of improper documents to present a prima
facie case for enforcement, a party seeking to avoid the confirmation
and enforcement of an arbitral award under the Convention can raise
one of seven enumerated defenses listed in Article V.76 However, a
party raising one of these seven defenses will have no easier task than a
party raising jurisdictional or evidential grounds to block enforcement
because not only does the party raising these defenses bear the burden
of proving their applicability,"7 but he is also faced with a very limited
standard of review of an arbitrator's decision by the federal court.78
This limited review by courts of arbitrators' decisions under the
Convention has long been upheld by the federal courts in all areas of
arbitration. In Trans-Asiatic Oil Ltd. S.A. v. UCO Marine Interna-
tional Ltd.,7 9 the District Court for the Southern District of New York
73. See, e.g., Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 488 F. Supp. 1284
(S.D.N.Y. 1980), affd on other grounds, 647 F.2d 320 (2d Cir. 1981), rev'd on other
grounds, 461 U.S. 480 (1983).
74. Id. at 1302.
75. Id.
76. Convention, supra note 2, at 40, 42, art. V. A court within three years after
an arbitral award is made may confirm the award upon petition to the court and the
court must confirm the award unless "it finds one of the grounds for refusal or deferral
of [the] recognition or enforcement of the award specified in the said Convention." 9
U.S.C. § 207.
77. The first five defenses discussed infra can be raised solely by the party seeking
to avoid enforcement of an arbitral award.
78. In addition to the limited review accorded by federal district courts, there is a
deeply entrenched philosophy that the seven defenses enumerated in the Convention
must be very narrowly construed. See Comment, The Federal Courts and The En-
forcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 5 PACE L. REV. 151, 151-152 (1984). This
effectively makes the party's task seeking to block enforcement almost impossible.
79. Trans-Asiatic Oil Ltd. S.A. v. UCO Marine International Ltd., 618 F. Supp.
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summarized the standard of review and the applicable case law:
The Court's power to vacate an arbitration award is limited to the
grounds set forth in 9 U.S.C. §10. Wilco v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 74
S.Ct. 182, 98 L.Ed. 168 (1953). Arbitrators are not required to
explain their conclusions in the awards they issue. Id. at 436, 74
S.Ct. 187; Sobel v. Hertz, Warner & Co., 469 F.2d 1211, 1214 (2d
Cir. 1972). "When arbitrators explain their conclusions . . . in
terms that offer even a barely colorable justification for the out-
come reached, confirmation of the award cannot be prevented by
litigants who merely argue ... for a different result." Andros Com-
pania Maritima v. Marc Rich & Co., 579 F.2d 691, 704 (2d Cir.
1978). It is not the function of the district court to review the rec-
ord of the arbitration proceedings for errors of law or fact. Saxis S1
S Co. v. Multifacs International Traders, 375 F.2d 577, 581-82
(2d Cir. 1967).80
This limited standard of review of an arbitrator's decision has been
consistently upheld under the Convention."1
1. Absence of Valid Arbitration Agreement
The first defense listed in the Convention is the absence of a valid
arbitration agreement. 82 This defense is seldom raised because the real-
132 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
80. Id. at 135.
81. See, e.g., Amoco Overseas Oil Co. v. Astir Navigation Co., 490 F. Supp. 32
(S.D.N.Y. 1979); La Societe Nationale v. Shaheen Natural Resources, 585 F. Supp.
57 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd, 733 F.2d 260 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 883
(1984). Agreeing with the limited review by judicial bodies of arbitration decisions, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit stated that it would not review
the record of arbitration to discover errors of fact or law. Parsons, 508 F.2d at 977.
The court stated this was a role that it had "emphatically declined" in the past and
rejects once again. Id. "'[Elxtensive judicial review frustrates the basic purpose of
arbitration, which is to dispose of disputes quickly and avoid the expense and delay of
extended court proceedings.'" Id. This limited review thwarted the appellant's efforts
to have the Second Circuit vacate an order confirming an foreign arbitral award on the
basis of the award's manifest disregard of the law. Id.
82. "Recognition and enforcement of the award may be refused, at the request of
the party against whom it is invoked, only if that party furnishes ... proof that: (a) the
parties to the agreement . . . were, under the law applicable to them, under some
incapacity, or the said agreement is not valid under the law to which the parties have
subjected it or, failing any indication thereon, under the law of the country where the
award was made .. " Convention, supra note 2, at 40, art. V(l)(a).
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ity of a written arbitration agreement is difficult to refute.8 However,
the agreement's validity is to be judged against the law governing the
contract or, absent this indication, the law of the country where en-
forcement is sought.8 ' In Rhone Mediterranee Compagnie v. Lauro,8"
the plaintiff insurer brought suit as subrogee to recover payments made
to the owner of a time charter vessel that burned en route to its desti-
nation.86 The owner filed a motion to dismiss the suit due to the exis-
tence of a valid arbitration agreement contained in the contract be-
tween the owner and the time charterer of the vessel.87 Rhone, the
plaintiff insurer, contended however that the arbitration agreement
should be disregarded because it was null and void under Italian law.88
Under Italian law, arbitration is valid only if conducted by an odd
number of arbitrators. However, this was not specified in the subject
contract. Rhone "contended that when an arbitration clause refers to a
place of arbitration [in this case Italy], the law of that place is determi-
native of 'null and void'."89 Both the district and circuit court dis-
agreed. The district court noted that the drafters of the Convention
intended that awards be enforced unless such awards offended the fed-
eral law or public policy of the forum and that such enforcement would
not be denied simply because the award would not be capable of en-
forcement under a foreign forum's law.9" The Court of Appeals af-
firmed, holding that "the validity of the arbitration clause should be
measured against the fundamental policy of the Convention, which is to
encourage the enforceability of arbitration agreements. Accordingly,
since the Italian rule as to the number of arbitrators did not implicate
the fundamental concerns of the Convention, the arbitration agreement
was valid." 91
In Oriental Commercial & Shipping Co. v. Rosseel, 2 the United
83. von Mehren, supra note 23, at 358.
84. See supra note 79.
85. Rhone Mediterranee Compagnie v. Lauro, 555 F. Supp. 481 (D.V.I. 1982),
712 F.2d 50 (3d Cir. 1983).
86. Id. at 481-82.
87. Id. at 482.
88. Id. at 483.
89. Leigh, Commentary on Judicial Decisions: Rhone Mediterrannee Compagnie
v. Lauro and Bergesen v. Joseph Muller Corp., 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 217, 217 (Jan.
1984).
90. Rhone, 555 F. Supp. at 485.
91. Leigh, supra note 89, at 217. This Commentary contains a good discussion of
the Rhone case.
92. Oriental Commercial & Shipping Co. v. Rosseel, 609 F. Supp. 75 (S.D.N.Y.
1985).
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States District Court for the Southern District of New York followed
the Third Circuit's ruling in Rhone and moved to compel arbitration
despite one party's contention that the agreement to arbitrate was null
and void. The district court held that under the Convention an arbitra-
tion agreement was null and void "only when it is subject to interna-
tionally recognized defenses such as duress, mistake, fraud or waiver,
or when it contravenes fundamental policies of the forum nation." 93
Utilizing this standard and pursuing a goal of implementing the inten-
tions of the parties, the district court held a telex, sent by the seller
which included an arbitration clause, to be a valid agreement. 94
Due to the heavy burden that defendants must bear to prove an
agreement is null or void, this defense has not proven very successful
even when attacking the agreement on the grounds of duress, mistake,
fraud, waiver, or fundamental policy. In Island Territory of Curacao v.
Solitron Devices,9 5 the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York, extending this judicial skepticism, confirmed an
arbitral award and the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit affirmed the confirmation despite the assertion that the contract
containing the agreement had been terminated due to impossibility.
Solitron, defending against both the enforcement of the foreign judicial
decision confirming the award and the confirmation by the American
court of the arbitral award, asserted that it had been fraudulently in-
duced to sign a contract to locate manufacturing plants in Curacao. 96
The district court held that fraud in the inducement of a total contract
is an issue to be ruled upon by an arbitral panel only when a valid
agreement is contained within the contract.9 7 The court reasoned that
if fraud is to be in the exclusive jurisdiction of the arbitral panel, then
frustration and impossibility should also be decided by arbitrators. 8
By delegating the resolution of the issues of fraud and impossibil-
93. Id. at 78.
94. Id.
95. Island Territory of Curacao v. Solitron Devices, 356 F. Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y.
1973), aff'd on different grounds, 489 F.2d 1313 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S.
986 (1974).
96. Solitron, an American company, argued that such a location was attractive
due to the low minimum wage structure of Curacao and that the government of
Curacoa had led Solitron to believe that "the wage structure would remain stable." Id.
at I1. In reality, the wages were increased rather drastically after major governmental
policy changes were made in Curacao. After the increase in wages, Solitron lost inter-
est in the venture, giving rise to the dispute. Id. at 6.
97. Id. at 11 citing Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S.
395, 404 (1967).
98. id.
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ity to an arbitral panel, the federal courts have undermined the viabil-
ity of these defenses because, by their act of granting an award, the
arbitration panel has implicitly ruled that the contract was not fraudu-
lently induced, nor terminated by impossibility or frustration. It should
be noted, however, that the courts have maintained their right to ex-
amine an assertion that the arbitration agreement itself was fraudu-
lently induced.99
Parties seeking to avoid enforcement of arbitral awards have also
sought to prove the absence of a valid agreement due to waiver of the
right to arbitrate. Just as a party may voluntarily enter into an arbitra-
tion agreement, the same party may waive this contractual right. 100
However, this argument has not proven successful in the majority of
cases. Both the United States Courts of Appeals for the Fourth and
Fifth Circuit, when faced with the defense of a null and void agree-
ment due to waiver, failed to find circumstances supporting the defense
and have held that the mere passage of time without ensuing prejudice
to the party alleging waiver cannot constitute an implicit waiver of
arbitration.101
In addition to the defense that the agreement to arbitrate is null
and void, Article V of the Convention states that a court may refuse to
enforce an arbitral award if the parties to the contract lacked capac-
ity.102 A defense on this basis has not been reported in any United
States court.103
2. Procedural Defects of Arbitration
The second major defense of Article V of the Convention states
that if "the party against whom the award is invoked was not given
proper notice of the appointment of the arbitrator or of the arbitration
proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his case," the court
may refuse to recognize and enforce the award.10 4 This defense incor-
porates the requirement of due process as interpreted by the enforcing
state.10 5 Within the United States, the courts have limited the use of
this defense to two circumstances: (1) where the party did not receive
99. See, e.g., Prima Paint Corp., 388 U.S. at 403-04.
100. Sedco, 767 F.2d at 1150.
101. I.T.A.D. Associates v. Podar Bros., 636 F.2d 75, 77 (4th Cir. 1981) and
Sedco, 767 F.2d at 1150-51.
102. Convention, supra note 2, at 40, art. V(1)(a).
103. McLaughlin & Genevro, supra note 1, at 265 no. 101, citing A. VAN DEN
BERG, supra note 4, at 288.
104. Convention, supra note 2, at 42, art. V(1)(b).
105. AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, supra note 15, at 20.
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proper notice of the proceeding; or, (2) where the party lacked an op-
portunity to be heard.106
This defense has been asserted often by parties opposing enforce-
ment of an arbitral award. Parties raising this argument have utilized
many alleged deficiencies in support of their procedural defense. In
Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co., 07 the defendant alleged inter
alia that he was not given proper notice and was unable to present his
case before the arbitration panel.'"' This allegation was based upon the
arbitration panel's refusal to delay the proceedings to allow one of the
party's key witnesses to testify. 09 The court dismissed this argument
finding that the "[i]nability to produce one's witnesses before an arbi-
tral tribunal is a risk inherent in an agreement to submit to
arbitration."'" 0
Other parties relying on different procedural defects have met with
a similar lack of success. In Imperial Ethiopian Government v. Baruch-
Foster Corp.,"' the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's confirma-
tion of an arbitral award despite the assertion by defendant Baruch-
Foster that it was denied discovery on the question of arbitrator bias.1 2
The expiration of time limitations has also proven to be an unsuccessful
procedural defense. In La Societe Nationale, the district court of New
York also denied the defendant's motion to dismiss a case for the con-
firmation of an award despite the assertion that the defendant's proce-
dural rights had been abridged." s The defendant moved to dismiss the
case because the award was not rendered by the arbitral body in accor-
dance with the time limits set by the International Chamber of Com-
merce which governed the agreement." 4 The court, however, found no
validity to this argument, holding that even if this were a proper basis
for a procedural defense, the International Chamber of Commerce time
106. See Comment, supra note 78, at 164.
107. Parsons, 508 F.2d at 971.
108. Id.
109. Id. The arbitration panel did however consider an affidavit of the witness.
110. Id. at 975. "Overseas' due process rights under American Law, rights enti-
tled to full force under the Convention as a defense to enforcement, were in no way
infringed by the tribunal's decision." Id. at 976.
111. Imperial Ethiopian Government v. Baruch Foster Corp., 535 F.2d 334, 337
(5th Cir. 1976).
112. As one author has noted, the Fifth Circuit characterized this request for dis-
covery as an attempt made in bad faith to thwart recognition of the award. See Com-
ment, supra note 78, at 177-78.
113. La Societe Nationale, 585 F. Supp. at 64.
114. Id. at 65.
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limits had been met.116
3. Inadequacy of the Scope of the Arbitration Agreement
Finding the previously discussed defenses inappropriate or unat-
tractive, parties seeking to defend against enforcement have also relied
upon Article V (1)(c). This section states that the court may refuse to
enforce the award if "[t]he award deals with a difference not contem-
plated by or not falling within the terms of the submission to arbitra-
tion, or it contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submis-
sion to arbitration . . . .,,116
Courts have consistently held that this defense must be narrowly
construed and that arbitration agreements must be interpreted broadly
to allow for arbitration of a maximum number of disputes. 1 7 The Fifth
Circuit, when faced with the assertion that an arbitration agreement
did not cover the subject dispute and therefore, arbitration should not
be compelled, agreed with the broad reading of such agreements. In
Sedco v. Retreoles Mexicanos Mexican,"18 the district court held that
arbitration should not be denied unless a court is certain that an agree-
ment cannot be interpreted so as to cover the subject dispute. The court
further stated that as a general rule, when the interpretation of an
agreement and the coverage of a dispute by such agreement is uncer-
tain, the question should be resolved in favor of arbitration. 19
4. Arbitrator Bias
The next defense enumerated in the Convention is contained in
Article V (l)(d). This section states that if the composition of the arbi-
tral authority or procedure was not in accordance with the parties'
agreement or the law of the country of award, the court may refuse to
115. Id.
116. Convention, supra note 2, at 42, art. V(l)(c).
117. See generally Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 105 S.
Ct. 3346, 3352 n.9; Laminoirs-Trefileries-Cableries de Lens, S.A. v. Southwire Co.,
484 F. Supp. 1063, 1069 (N.D. Ga. 1980); Oriental Commercial and Shipping Co. v.
Rosseel N.V., 609 F. Supp. 75, 77-78 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Parsons, 508 F.2d at 976-77.
118. Sedco, 767 F.2d at 1145.
119. Id. (citing United Steel Workers v. Warrion & Gulf Navigation Co., 363
U.S. 574, 80 S.Ct. 1347 (1960) and City of Meridian, Miss. v. Algernon Blair, Inc.,
721 F.2d 525 (5th Cir. 1983)). Although Sedco dealt with a case in which an order
compelling arbitration was sought, this same reasoning was utilized where enforcement
of an award was sought. See e.g., Parsons, 508 F.2d at 969. Laminoirs-Trefileries-
Calderies de Lens v. Southwire Co., 484 F. Supp. 1063 (N.D. Ga. 1980).
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enforce the award upon the provision of adequate proof."' This defense
has frequently been utilized to argue that the arbitrators were biased in
violation of the parties' agreement. However, for various reasons, par-
ties asserting this defense have met with little success.
First, one of the benefits of arbitration is the ability of the parties
to choose panel members who are experts in the field of the dispute.
Because of the tremendous demand for a small number of renowned
experts, many of these experts may jointly serve on many arbitration
panels, possibly in other disputes surrounding one or both of the parties
now in disagreement.121 Secondly, in an effort to advance the goals of
the Convention, courts will often be very skeptical of broad brushed
assertions of bias, not raised before the arbitral panel itself, and subse-
quently raised to block enforcement of the award.1 2 Courts may even
characterize these attempts as made in bad faith.'23
In Andros Compania Maritima v. Marc Rich & Co.,12 1 the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit was faced with an assertion that an
arbitration award should not be confirmed due to the appellant's lack
of opportunity in the lower court to prove arbitrator bias. Finding that
the principles of Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casu-
alty Co., 25 should be applied, 2 6 the court held that arbitrators are re-
quired to disclose any relationship that might give an impression of
bias, but an arbitrator will not automatically be disqualified due to a
business relationship with the parties before him, so long as this rela-
tionship is disclosed. 2 7
120. Convention, supra note 2, at 42, art. V(I)(d).
121. von Mehren, supra note 23, at 360.
122. See, e.g., LaSociets Nationale, 585 F. Supp. at 65.
123. See, e.g., Imperial Ethiopian Government, 535 F.2d at 334.
124. Andros Compania Maritima v. Marc Rich & Co., 579 F.2d 691 (2d Cir.
1975).
125. Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co., 393 U.S. 145
(1968).
126. The court summarized these principles as applying equally in both interna-
tional and domestic arbitration. Andros, 579 F.2d at 691.
127. Id. at 697-98 (citing Commonwealth Coating, 393 U.S. at 148-149). The
Second Circuit in Andros also noted that it could only find one instance after Common-
wealth Coatings where an appellant had successfully pleaded undisclosed arbitrator
bias. Id. at 700 (citing Sank S. S. Co. v. Cook Industries, 495 F.2d 1260 (2d Cir.
1973)). One author has stated that the results in these cases are proper because "to
require that there be no prior contacts between an arbitrator and a party would ...
often pose an insurmountable obstacle to finding a knowledgeable arbitrator." von
Mehren, supra note 23 at 360.
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5. Ineffective Arbitral Award
The last of the defenses to recognition and enforcement of an arbi-
tral award that can be raised solely by the party seeking to avoid such
enforcement is stated in Article V (1)(e) of the Convention. This arti-
cle states that a court may refuse to recognize and enforce an award if
the award has not yet become binding, or has been set aside or sus-
pended in the country of award.12 8 United States courts have not re-
quired that all appeals in the country of the award be exhausted prior
to enforcement. 2 9 One commentator has noted that the only require-
ment to have a "binding" award in the eyes of American courts is to
have "no further recourse . . . to another arbitral tribunal."130 How-
ever, the district court's opinion in Island Territory of Curacao demon-
strates that this point is valid only for arbitration concerning specific
issues covered by the award. 3' The possibility of future arbitration
concerning related issues revolving around the same dispute will not
prevent an Americah court from finding the arbitral award binding.13 2
In Island Territory of Curacao, Solitron, the party seeking to
avoid confirmation of the arbitral award, objected that the award was
"not final, definitive and conclusive" because the arbitrators left open
the possibility of further arbitration to set damages for a time period
not covered by the subject award. 3 The district court disagreed and
dismissed Solitron's objection stating, "[t]hat at some time in the fu-
ture another arbitration and another award are possibilities does not
mean that the present award at the present time is not 'final' and 'defi-
nite'."'31 4 To be not "final," the court felt that at a minimum, the
amount of the award must be left unresolved. 135
128. Convention, supra note 2, at 42, art. V(l(e).
129. von Mehren, supra note 23, at 360.
130. Aksen, American Arbitration Accession Arrives in the Age of Aquarius, 3 S.
W. UNIV. L. REV. 1, 11 (1971).
131. Island Territory of Curacao, 356 F. Supp. at 9.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 11. Although Solitron raised this defense under Chapter One of the
United States Arbitration Act and not under Article V(I)(e) of the Convention, as
implemented by Chapter Two of the same act, the plaintiff sought enforcement of the
award under Chapter Two of the Arbitration Act and the Convention. Because the
award was ultimately confirmed under the Convention, the court's interpretation of this
defense is as applicable under Chapter One as it is under Chapter Two of the United
States Arbitration Act.
134. Id. at 2.
135. Id.
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6. Nonarbitrability
In addition to the five defenses previously discussed, Section 2 of
Article V of the Convention lists two additional defenses that may be
raised either by a party wishing to avoid enforcement of an arbitral
award, or by the court sua sponte. 1
6
The first of these defenses enumerated in the Article V of the Con-
vention states that "[tihe subject matter of the defense is not capable
of settlement by arbitration under the law of [the enforcing] country
. . .- 7 To be successful under this section, a party must prove that
the country of enforcement attaches a special interest to the dispute
which renders the dispute nonarbitrable. 3 8 Consideration of this de-
fense is most susceptible to the countervailing pressures applied by the
strong desire of the courts to promote arbitration, and of the realization
that important national interests cannot be arbitrated.1 3 9
This defense of "nonarbitrability" was raised by the defendant in
Parsons & Whittemore Overseas v. Societe Generale De L'Industrie
Du Papier."0 Parsons, seeking reversal of confirmation of an arbitral
award, contended that "U.S. foreign policy issues can hardly be placed
at the mercy of foreign arbitrators 'who are charged with the execution
of no public trust' and whose loyalties are to foreign interests."' 1
The Second Circuit refused to reverse the confirmation of the arbi-
tral award despite the precarious predicament of Parsons. "' The court
held that "[slimply because acts of the United States are somehow im-
plicated in a case one cannot conclude that the United States is vitally
interested in its outcome. . . . There is no special national interest in
judicial, rather than arbitral, resolution of the breach of contract claim
underlying the award in this case.' ' 4
3
136. See Comment, supra note 78, at 170, for a discussion.
137. Convention, supra note 2, at 42, art. V(2)(a).
138. Comment, supra note 78, at 170.
139. Id. at 171 (citing Scherk, 417 U.S. at 508 and Parsons, 508 F.2d at 974-75).
140. Parsons, 508 F.2d at 969.
141. Id. at 975. Parsons' invocation of US. foreign policy was based upon the
facts giving rise to the dispute. Parsons, an American corporation, contracted with the
respondent to construct and manage a paperboard mill in Egypt. Work proceeded until
May of 1967 when the Egyptian government broke diplomatic relations with the
United States and ordered all Americans, with the exception of those who qualified for
a special visa, out of Egypt. Employees of Parsons stopped work and left Egypt and
Parsons sent notification to the respondent that the stoppage of work should be excused
under the force majeure clause of the contract. The respondent disagreed and a subse-
quent arbitral panel agreed with the respondent. Id. at 972.
142. Id. For a brief discussion on Parsons' situation, see supra note 141.
143. Id. at 975.
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In Northrup Corp. v. Triad Financial Establishment,14 4 Northrup,
another American corporation, found itself in a similar situation. Plain-
tiff Northrup had entered into a marketing agreement with Triad, by
which Triad was to operate as Northrup's sole representative for the
sale of products to Saudi Arabia. 145 For their efforts, Triad was to re-
ceive a commission for all products sold to Saudi Arabia, both directly,
because of Triad's efforts, and indirectly, upon the request of the
United States Department of Defense. During the effective period of
the marketing agreement, the Saudi Arabian government advised the
Department of Defense that "the use of intermediaries with respect to
arms sales to the Saudi government [indirect sales in the terms of the
marketing agreement] would not be permitted."146 The Department of
Defense advised Northrup of this development and Northrup termi-
nated its agreement with Triad. Triad refused to agree to the termina-
tion and requested arbitration in accordance with the contract. The ar-
bitral tribunal found Northrup liable for its breach of the contract and
the subsequent action was filed in the United States District Court for
California to confirm the award against Northrup. Northrup, seeking
vacation of the award, contended that the tribunal had exceeded its
authority by deciding issues that were nonarbitrable.1 47 Northrup char-
acterized these issues as those "affecting fundamental public inter-
ests.114 8 Although the court ultimately vacated a portion of the arbitral
award due to the agreement's illegality, the court noted the strong pref-
erence for enforcement of arbitral awards, particularly in international
agreements.1 49 Based upon this strong preference, the court concluded
that the dispute, despite its national "overtones," had been properly
submitted to arbitration.1 50
Despite the defendant's general lack of success in asserting the
"nonarbitrability" defense, other parties have raised it in the context of
a defense to confirmation of an arbitral award. In Libyan American Oil
Co. v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahirya,1 5 1 the Libyan Amer-
144. Northrup Corp. v. Triad Financial Establishment, 593 F. Supp. 928 (D. Cal.
1984).
145. Id. at 930-932.
146. Id. at 932.
147. Id. at 934. "Specifically, Northrop challenge[d] the tribunal's authority to
construe United States policy as announced by DOD in statements and publications,
and as codified by Congress in the FCPA and Saudi Decree." Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 935-36.
150. Id. at 936.
151. Libyan American Oil Co. v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahirya, 482
F. Supp. 1175 (D.D.C. 1980).
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ican Oil Company (LIAMCO) brought an action in district court to
confirm and enforce an arbitration award against Libya. 52 As one of
its defenses to the confirmation of the award, Libya raised the act of
state doctrine asserting that the award was not capable of settlement in
the United States. 153 The District Court agreed with Libya and refused
to enforce the arbitral award. 54
The facts leading to the dispute involved the nationalization of cer-
tain of LIAMCO's rights and oil drilling equipment by the government
of Libya.15 5 Following unsuccessful negotiations between Libya and
LIAMCO, LIAMCO initiated arbitration under the contract between
LIAMCO and Libya. 56 A subsequent arbitral panel found in favor of
LIAMCO and LIAMCO brought action in the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia to enforce the award when Libya
refused to abide by its terms. 15
Supporting its decision not to enforce the award, the District
Court stated that the subject matter of the difference was the nationali-
zation of LIAMCO's assets and the rate at which LIAMCO should be
compensated for these assets by Libya.'58 The court concluded that it
could not have compelled the parties to arbitrate the dispute initially
because "in so doing [the court] would have been compelled to rule on
the validity of the Libyan nationalization law" which determined the
procedures for setting the rate of compensation. 59
152. Id. at 1176.
153. Id. at 1177. The act of state doctrine as invoked by the District Court in the
Libyan American Oil case requires courts to refrain from judging the validity of public
acts of foreign sovereign states. One author has stated that this doctrine should not be
given deference either in the arbitration proceeding itself, nor in an action to enforce
the award, von Mehren, supra note 23, at 357.
Arbitration is a private, consensual procedure; it does not involve any examination
by the "judicial branch," or any other organ of the state, into the validity of the
actions of any other foreign state. Moreover, neither the New York Convention
nor the Federal Arbitration Act permits a reexamination by the courts during an
enforcement action of the merits of the dispute which was before the arbitrations.
Therefore, the act of state doctrine should be given no application in or with re-
spect to arbitration.
Id. In view of this criticism of the applicability of the act of state doctrine in arbitra-
tion, it is doubtful that Libyan American Oil Co. will impact greatly on the choice of
defenses to confirmation of arbitration awards.
154. Libyan, 482 F. Supp. at 1179.
155. Id. at 1176.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 1178.
159. Id. Despite the court's decision, the parties in this action reached a settle-
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The "nonarbitrability" defense has been considerably narrowed in
recent years by federal courts in both domestic and international cases.
This narrowing has been primarily accomplished by expanding the is-
sues appropriate for arbitration that previously were held to be strictly
within the jurisdiction of the courts. Disputes surrounding the federal
securities laws are one such type of issue previously held inappropriate
for arbitration.
Since the Supreme Court case of Wilko v. Swan,160 disputes sur-
rounding possible violations of the 1933 Securities Exchange Act have
been found to be addressable only within the judicial system. The hold-
ing of Wilko was based upon the Court's finding that the 1933 Securi-
ties Exchange Act conferred upon aggrieved parties an unwaivable
right to address violations of the Act in a federal court. 161 Despite their
recognition of the advantages of arbitration in commercial transactions,
the Court found that the intentions of Congress would best be served in
a court which was required to make a complete record of their findings
and conclusions, which had the requisite knowledge to handle legal
concepts such as the burden of proof, reasonable care and material fact
and whose decision would not be subjected to only a limited review.162
Although the 1934 Securities Exchange Act did not contain the
same language as the 1933 Act upon which the Supreme Court had
based its finding in Wilko of an "irrevocable right", many courts inter-
preted the Wilko decision to mean that no securities disputes could be
submitted to arbitration. 63
However, in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver,14 the Supreme Court re-
fused to apply their holding in Wilko, distinguishing the cases on the
basis of the international context in Scherk.'6" The action in this 1974
case was brought by an American company, Alberto-Culver, against a
German citizen to recover damages under the 1934 United States Fed-
eral Securities Exchange Act. 66 Alberto-Culver alleged that Scherk
had made fraudulent representations concerning certain trademarks
ment and the decision was vacated. See generally, von Mehren, supra note 23, at 358.
160. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
161. Id. at 435. The court viewed an agreement to arbitrate a dispute as a poten-
tial "waiver" of litigation right. Id.
162. Id. at 436. The Court "decide[d] that the intention of Congress concerning
the sale of securities is better carried out by holding invalid such an agreement for
arbitration of issues under the Act." Id. at 438.
163. In fact, some courts still hold this opinion. See, e.g., Avent v. Shearson, 633
F. Supp. 770 (D. Mass. 1985).
164. Sherk, 417 U.S. at 506.
165. Id.
166. Id.
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which Alberto-Culver purchased in reliance on Scherk's statements. 6 7
Scherk sought to stay the proceedings while the dispute was arbitrated
in accordance with the arbitration agreement in the contract of sale.
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois
refused to stay the proceedings and the United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit affirmed.
1 68
The Supreme Court reversed the lower courts refusal to stay the
proceedings characterizing the agreement to arbitrate as a type of fo-
rum selection.1 69 The Court stated that to refuse to stay the proceed-
ings and invalidate the arbitration agreement would permit the Ameri-
can company to repudiate its contractual promise.170 Further, the court
distinguished Wilko on the grounds that Wilko had involved a purely
domestic arbitration where there was no uncertainty as to the particu-
lar laws that would govern the dispute. 1 7 However, in an international
dispute such as that involved in Scherk, much controversy surrounded
the proper forum and conflict of laws.172 The Court characterized arbi-
tration agreements as an advanced effort to resolve these questions. 7
The Scherk decision is certainly a major narrowing of the nonarbi-
trability defense, not principally because of the number of international
disputes involving the securities area, but because of the demise of such
a deeply entrenched philosophy of nonarbitrability of federal securities
disputes. This important decision has prompted some federal courts,
even in domestic arbitration cases, to hold that disputes surrounding
the 1934 Securities Exchange Act may also be arbitrated. 7 4
The federal courts' narrowing of the scope of nonarbitrable issues
has also caused the consequent demise of another jurisdictional princi-
ple, the intertwining doctrine. This doctrine held that when arbitrable
and nonarbitrable issues or complaints arose out of the same transac-
tion and were "sufficiently intertwined factually and legally," the
167. Id.
168. Sherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 484 F.2d 611, 615 (7th Cir. 1973).
169. Sherk, 417 U.S. at 519.
170. Id. The Court further held that such a finding would demonstrate an out-
dated and improper concept that all disputes in international contracts must be settled
according to United States laws and in United States courts - a concept first cautioned
against in The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 9 (1971). The Supreme
Court voiced once again, as they did in Bremen, that "[w]e cannot have trade and
commerce in world markets and international waters exclusively on our terms, gov-
erned by our laws, and resolved in our courts." Id. (citing Bremen, 407 U.S. at 9).
171. Sherk, 417 U.S. at 515-16.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. See, e.g., Brenen v. Becker Paribas, Inc., 628 F. Supp. 442 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
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courts could, in their discretion, refuse to compel arbitration of any
claims and try all the claims in federal court. 17 5 Such a doctrine was
believed to be necessary to preserve the federal courts' exclusive juris-
diction over federal securities disputes and to avoid bifurcated and re-
dundant proceedings.176 However, in Dean Witter Reynolds v. Byrd,17
the Supreme Court held that the United States Arbitration Act
divested the district courts of any discretion to refuse to compel arbi-
tration of claims that were viewed as arbitrable.178 In reaching this
conclusion, the Supreme Court reversed the lower court's refusal to
compel arbitration of claims of breach of state securities laws that were
appended to the claims of federal security law violations.1 79 Judicial
resolution of the federal claims was therefore stayed until the arbitra-
tion could be completed.
Although Byrd involved only domestic parties and domestic inter-
ests, the demise of the intertwining doctrine has had an important ef-
fect on international arbitrations as well. This impact has been demon-
strated in Sedco v Petroleos Mexicanos Mexican National Oil Co. 80
In Sedco, the American owner of a drilling vessel destroyed by an oil
spill in the Gulf of Mexico brought suit against the charterer of the
vessel for failing to indemnify the owner against all claims arising from
the spill.18' The owner argued that this indemnification was in accor-
dance with a clause contained in the charter party. 82 As a defense, the
charterer raised the arbitration clause. The lower court refused to stay
the proceeding nor compel arbitration.18 3 On appeal by the charterer
seeking to reverse the lower court's decision, the owner of the vessel
argued that an appellate court lacks jurisdiction to hear an appeal from
a lower court's refusal to order arbitration in an admiralty case. 184 This
argument was based upon the doctrine first announced in Schoenam-
sgruber v. Hamburg American Line, 8 5 which states that a court of ap-
peals lacks jurisdiction to hear appeals based upon a lower court's order
staying admiralty proceedings pending arbitration. 86 Appellate courts
175. Dean Witter Reynolds v. Byrd, 105 S. Ct. 1238, 1240 (1985).
176. Id.
177. Byrd, 105 S. Ct. at 1238.
178. Id. at 1241.
179. Id. at 1240-1241.
180. Sedco, 767 F.2d 1140.
181. Id. at 1143.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 1144.
184. Id.
185. Schoenamsgruber v. Hamburg American Line, 294 U.S. 454 (1935).
186. Id. at 458.
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have often applied this principle to divest themselves of jurisdiction to
hear orders refusing to stay proceedings.1 87 However, noting the strong
pro-enforcement philosophy of American courts and the demise of the
intertwining doctrine, the Court of Appeals in Sedco assumed jurisdic-
tion and compelled arbitration.1 18 With this decision, the Court of Ap-
peals removed another obstacle to arbitration and further signaled their
continuing expansion of arbitration jurisdiction.
The demise of the intertwining and Schoenamsgruber doctrines,
and the consequent increase and expansion of issues determined to be
"arbitrable", can also be viewed as a natural extension of the Supreme
Court decision in Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Con-
struction Corp. 189 In that case, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court
of Appeals' reversal of an order denying arbitration and a stay of judi-
cial proceedings.19 The federal District Court's denial was based upon
the court's desire to avoid multiple proceedings to resolve federal and
pendant state claims.1 91 The Supreme Court, however, did not find this
to be a legitimate reason to deny arbitration.1 9 The Supreme Court
stated that the fact that Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital would be
forced to resolve the issues of the case in different forums "occurs be-
cause the relevant federal law requires piecemeal resolution when nec-
essary to give effect to an arbitration agreement."1 93
This desire to arbitrate certain isolated issues of a case despite re-
sultant multiple proceedings again reinforces the trend in federal courts
to abide by the purpose and goal of the United States Arbitration Act
and the Convention. Through the Moses Cone opinion, the Supreme
Court confirmed the absence of any judicial discretion to deny arbitra-
tion in the presence of a valid arbitration agreement. The Moses Cone
opinion will allow federal courts to compel arbitration and enforce
awards concerning disputes other than those involving securities where
the intertwining doctrine would be inapplicable.
The most recent major development in the courts' reduction of the
number of issues considered inappropriate for arbitration involves anti-
trust disputes. Until the Supreme Court decision in Mitsubishi Motors
187. Sedco, 767 F.2d at 1148 n. 21.
188. Id. at 1147-48.
189. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp., 460 U.S.
1 (1983).
190. Id. at 4.
191. Id. at 13.
192. Id. at 20.
193. Id.
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Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth," ' antitrust disputes had been con-
sidered within the exclusive jurisdiction of the judicial system."' De-
spite adherence to this principle by higher courts, the United States
District Court for the District of Puerto Rico ordered arbitration of the
antitrust and unfair competition claims and counterclaims of both Mit-
subishi, the Japanese manufacturer plaintiff, and Soler, the Puerto Ri-
can dealer defendant. 196 On appeal by Soler, the Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit reversed the District Court's order compelling arbitra-
tion and upheld the traditional view that cases involving antitrust are
solely within the domain of the courts. 97 Criticizing this traditional
view, the Supreme Court held that despite their complexity and impor-
tance, antitrust disputes are proper issues for arbitration. 198 With re-
gard to the complexities of antitrust, the Court noted that the flexibility
of arbitration allowed panel members to be chosen from a variety of
fields of expertise, maximizing the chances of competent resolution.'"
Discussing the relative importance and impact of antitrust suits, the
Court recognized that judicial review of an arbitral panel's decision
would ultimately be available at the enforcement stage.200 With their
decision in Mitsubishi, the Supreme Court once again affirms the trend
of judicial recognition of the value of arbitration in minimizing the dif-
ficulties and resolving the complexities arising in international trade
disputes. 20 1
As the previous cases illustrate, the defense of nonarbitrability in
actions involving confirmation and enforcement of arbitral awards has
lost most of its vitality. Even where precedent is favorable to such a
defense, a party must realize that courts have regularly departed from
precedent in order to promote arbitration. Overall, this makes the de-
194. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 105 S. Ct. 3346
(1985).
195. This characterization of federal antitrust issues had been uniformly applied
by the Courts of Appeals in accordance with American Safety Equipment Corp. v. J.
P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968).
196. Mitsubishi, 105 S. Ct. at 3351. These allegations were raised under Puerto
Rican antitrust and unfair competition statutes.
197. Mitsubishi, 723 F.2d at 155. The Court of Appeals upheld the doctrine of
American Safety in reversing the district court. See supra note 195.
198. Id. at 3357-61.
199. Id. at 3358.
200. Id. at 3360.
201. Id. at 3355. "As in Scherk v. Alberto Culver Co., [see supra note 12] ....
[the court] concludeld) that concerns of international comity, respect for the capacities
of foreign and transnational tribunals, and sensitivity to the need of the international
commercial system for predictability in the resolution of disputes require that we en-
force the parties' agreement. ... Id.
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fense of nonarbitrability unattractive in most cases.
7. Public Policy
The second defense listed in Article V (2) of the Convention that
may be raised by a party or by the court sua sponte revolves around the
public policy of the forum country. Article V (2)(b) states that recogni-
tion and enforcement of an arbitral award may be refused if such en-
forcement would be "contrary to the public policy of ... [the enforc-
ing] country. ' ' 202 However, the importance of this defense has been
questioned. As one author has commented, "[t]he public policy defense
has [great] potential for obstructing the enforcement of arbitration
awards because of its vagueness. 1203 To avoid this problem, the federal
courts have construed this defense very narrowly, allowing the defense
to be successful in only three out of one hundred recent cases.
2 °"
The major case interpreting the "public policy" defense is Parsons
& Whittemore Overseas v. Societe Generale DeL'Industrie Du De
L'Industrie Papier2 01 Parsons, seeking to obtain an order reversing the
district court's confirmation of an arbitral award in favor of an Egyp-
tian corporation, argued that the enforcement of the award was against
United States public policy.20 Due to the eruption of the Arab-Israeli
Six Day War, Parsons' employees stopped work on a project in Egypt
and returned home upon the severance of American - Egyptian rela-
'tions.20 7 With the severance of these relations, the Agency for Interna-
tional Development, which had been financially supporting the Egyp-
tian corporation, withdrew all assistance.20 8 Parsons argued that this
action by a United States agency required Parsons, "as a loyal Ameri-
can citizen, to abandon the project" 209 and any "[e]nforcement of an
award predicated on the feasibility of [Parsons] returning to work in
defiance of these expressions of national policy would therefore alleg-
edly contravene United States policy. '210
The court dismissed Parson's argument criticizing its equation of
202. Convention, supra note 2, at 42, art. V(2)(b).
203. Comment, supra note 78, at 156-57.
204. Sanders, A Twenty Years' Review of the Convention the Recognition and
Enforcement of Arbitral Awards, 13 INT'L LAW. 269, 271 (1979).
205. Parsons, 508 F.2d at 969.
206. Id. at 973. For other discussion regarding Parsons, see supra notes 140-43
and accompanying text.
207. Id. at 972.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 974.
210. Id.
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national policy and public policy as "plainly miss[ing] the mark." ' 1
The court held that such an equation would severely undermine the
Convention, reasoning that the "public policy" envisioned by the fram-
ers of the Convention did not include all the "vagaries of international
politics."21 2 In a statement now considered to be the standard for judg-
ing such defenses, the court concluded that "[e]nforcement of foreign
arbitral awards may be denied on [a public policy] basis only where
enforcement would violate the forum state's most basic notions of mo-
rality and justice. 213
Because of the difficulties in meeting this standard enunciated in
Parsons, parties seeking to defend against enforcement and recognition
of an arbitral award utilizing the "public policy" objection have gener-
ally been unsuccessful. This has been illustrated in two separate cases
before the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York in 1976 and in 1983. In both Antco Shipping Co. v.
Sidermar21 4 and La Societe Nationale v. Shaheen Natural Re-
sources,21 5 defendants argued that the enforcement of an arbitral
award against them would contravene the public policy of the United
States due to alleged restrictive trade clauses contained in their con-
tracts with the plaintiffs. 216 In Antco Shipping, Antco, the charterer of
a vessel owned by Sidermar, argued that the exclusion in the charter
contract of Israeli ports from those to which the charterer was to sail
was a violation of the United States policy of free unrestricted trade
practices toward friendly nations.217 In La Societe Nationale, Shaheen
argued that the exclusive consignment of crude oil covered by its con-
tract with La Nationale to the buyer's installations was an "illegal lo-
cation restriction of the resale of goods."21 8 Applying the Parsons stan-
dard, the District Court rejected both arguments. The court concluded
that both issues failed to reach a level that contravened the public pol-
icy of the United States.1 '
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Antco Shipping Co. v. Siderman, 417 F. Supp. 207 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) aff'd
mem., 553 F.2d 93 (2d Cir. 1977).
215. La Societe Nationale, 585 F. Supp. 57.
216. Respectively, Antco Shipping Co., 417 F. Supp. at 211 and La Societe Na-
tionale, 585 F. Supp. at 63.
217. Antco Shipping Co., 417 F. Supp. at 211.
218. La Societe, 585 F. Supp. at 63.
219. Antco Shipping Co., 417 F. Supp. at 215-217, La Societe Nationale, 585 F.
Supp. at 63. See also, Waterside Ocean Navigation Co. v. International Navigation
Ltd., 737 F.2d 150 (2d Cir. 1984) and in Fertilizer Corp. of India, 530 F. Supp. at
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Despite the overwhelming lack of success parties have encountered
when raising the "public policy" defense, one party has successfully
invoked the defense. In Laminoirs-Trefileries-Cablemies de Leus v.
Southwine Co.,22 0 the District Court for the Northern District of Geor-
gia refused to enforce that portion of an arbitral decision awarding in-
terest. The interest rates utilized in the calculation were characterized
by the court as being so high that they were penal rather than compen-
satory and as "bear[ing] no reasonable relation to any damage result-
ing from delay in recovery of the sums awarded. 2 2' The court there-
fore concluded that these rates were against public policy based upon
this country's lack of legal recognition of penalties in calculating dam-
ages.222 This case represents one of the few reported successful invoca-
tions of the "public policy" defense.
8. Inapplicability of the Convention
Because of the lack of success that parties have encountered in
raising the defenses just summarized, a few parties have turned to an-
other avenue of defense in attempting to block enforcement of an arbi-
tration award. These parties have attempted to prove that the Conven-
tion simply does not apply in their particular circumstances. This line
of argument is based on the two reservations with which the United
States ratified the Convention. 3 The first such reservation allows a
contracting state to apply the Convention only on the basis of reciproc-
ity of ratification of the Convention. 2 ' Under this reservation, the con-
tracting state need only recognize arbitral awards rendered in other
states that have also ratified the Convention. The second reservation
542.
220. Laminoirs, 484 F. Supp. at 1063.
221. Id. at 1069.
222. "A foreign law will not be enforced if it is penal only and relates to the
punishing of public wrongs as contradistinguished from the redressing of private inju-
ries." Id. (citing Southern Railway Co. v. Decker, 5 Ga. App. 21, 25, 62 S. E. 678
(1908).
223. One issue that has not been properly addressed by the courts is the utiliza-
tion by these parties of defenses contained within Chapter One of the United States
Arbitration Act, but not included within Article V of the Convention. To date, courts
have sidestepped the issue by initially deciding that the facts of the case do not support
the defense even under Chapter One of the act. See Comment, supra note 78 at 178-
79; Parsons, 508 F.2d at 977. It is probable that when the courts do address this issue
they will find that the Chapter One defenses will be inapplicable under the purpose of
the Convention and the United States implementing legislation.
224. McLaughlin & Genevro, supra note 1, at 252 interpreting Article (1) of the
Convention.
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allows a nation to apply the Convention only to those transactions con-
sidered "commercial" by the enforcing nation.22 Parties seeking to de-
fend against enforcement proceedings under either of these reservations
have argued that since the United States has only adopted the Conven-
tion subject to both reservations, the courts should narrowly construe
the scope of the Convention and broadly construe the reservations and
subsequent defenses.22  However, despite the fact that the Convention
would have a broader application without the two reservations, this line
of argument has not been accepted.227
In reviewing allegations arising under the first reservation of lack
of ratification reciprocity, the federal courts have announced a few sim-
ple standards. First, it has been consistently held that the country of
the award is the sole determinative of reciprocity, with the nationalities
of the parties involved to be irrelevant.228 If the country of award is a
contracting state of the Convention, then other contracting states must
enforce the award, absent a valid defense.22 1 Additionally, it is irrele-
vant whether or not the contracting state in which the award was made
would actually enforce a similar award from the other contracting state
in which enforcement is sought.230 Because of these standards, most
parties raising this first reservation have met with little success.23 l
Parties seeking to utilize the second reservation have also met with
little success. In Island Territory of Curacao, Solitron, the defendant
opposing confirmation of the award, objected that the legal relationship
at the source of the dispute was not "commercial. 232 The District
Court for the Southern District of New York noted that there were no
225. Id.
226. See e.g., Bergesen, 710 F.2d at 932-33.
227. In fact, the courts have construed the two reservations as narrowly as the
seven defenses listed in the Convention. See McLaughlin & Genevro, supra note I, at
256. ("Consequently, application of the reservations has not provided a formula for
parties to subvert the broader goals underlying the Convention.")
228. See La Societe Nationale, 585 F. Supp. at 64.
229. Id.
230. See Fertilizer Corp. of India v. IDI Management, 517 F. Supp. 948 (S.D.
Ohio 1981) "[T]he issue of reciprocity goes only to whether a state has signed the
Convention and made a good faith attempt to abide by its rules and not to whether it
has actually enforced awards against its own citizens." Enforcing International Com-
mercial Arbitration Agreements and Awards Not Subject to the New York Conven-
tion, 23 VA. J. INT'L. L. 75, 82 (1982) (citing Fertilizer Corp. of India, 517 F. Supp.
at 952-53 and Leigh, Judicial Decision, Fertilizer Corp. of India v. IDI Management,
Inc., 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 166 (1982).
231. See e.g., Fertilizer Corp. of India, 517 F. Supp. at 948, La Societe Nation-
ale, 585 F. Supp. at 64; Rhone, 555 F. Supp. at 485.
232. Island Territory of Curacao, 356 F. Supp. at 12.
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judicial guidelines to indicate the purpose of this limitation.13 3 How-
ever, the court speculated that it was "to exclude matrimonial and
other domestic relations awards, political awards and the like."" 4 The
court ultimately concluded that under any test a contract with a com-
mercial manufacturer to build and operate a plant would constitute a
commercial relationship. 35
Whether the party is one attempting to prove that the Convention
simply does not apply due to the United States reservations or is a
party raising any of the seven defenses previously summarized, little
success has been achieved when trying to block recognition and en-
forcement of arbitral awards under the Convention. It would seem that
no surer case could be bought than one seeking such enforcement and
recognition.
III. CONCLUSION
The reluctance of United States federal courts to allow any objec-
tion or defense to undermine the Convention or the aim of international
arbitration is indicative of the present pro-enforcement philosophy
within the United States. It is, as if, in the years since the United
States ratification of the Convention and the passage of the United
States Arbitration Act in 1925, present courts have become as protec-
tive of arbitration and its field of application as previous courts were
protective of their own jurisdictional territory at the turn of the cen-
tury. The federal judicial system has realized that continuing interna-
tional business dealings would be impossible without an efficient means
of dispute resolution and that only with judicial protection and enforce-
ment of arbitration could such an efficient means be fostered. As the
Supreme Court has noted, in looking toward the future,
As international trade has expanded in recent decades, so too has
the use of international arbitration to resolve disputes arising in the
course of that trade. The controversies that international arbitral
institutions are called upon to resolve have increased in diversity as
well as in complexity. Yet the potential of these tribunals for effi-
cient disposition of legal disagreements arising from commercial re-
233. Id.
234. Id. at 13.
235. Id. The court held that "[iln the case of the United States' reservation it
seems clear that the full scope of 'commerce' and 'foreign commerce,' as those terms
have been broadly interpreted, is available for arbitral agreements and awards." Id.
(quoting Quigley, Convention on Foreign Arbitral Awards, 58 A.B.A.J. 821, 823
(1972)).
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lations has not yet been tested. If they are to take a central place in
the international legal order, national courts will need to "shake off
the old judicial hostility to arbitration," . . . and also their custom-
ary and understandable unwillingness to cede jurisdiction of a
claim arising under domestic law to a foreign or transnational tri-
bunal. To this extent at least, it will be necessary for national
courts to subordinate domestic notions of arbitrability to the inter-
national policy favoring commercial arbitration. 36
The federal courts have certainly followed this view and will, in
the future, continue to do so by enforcing and confirming the great
majority of arbitral awards brought before them.
Diana G. Richard
236. Mitsubishi, 105 S. Ct. at 3360.
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